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Abstract
We consider distributed elections, where there is a center and k sites. In such distributed
elections, each voter has preferences over some set of candidates, and each voter is assigned to
exactly one site such that each site is aware only of the voters assigned to it. The center is able
to directly communicate with all sites. We are interested in designing communication-efficient
protocols, allowing the center to maintain a candidate which, with arbitrary high probability,
is guaranteed to be a winner, or at least close to being a winner. We consider various single-
winner voting rules, such as variants of Approval voting and scoring rules, tournament-based
voting rules, and several round-based voting rules. For the voting rules we consider, we show
that, using communication which is logarithmic in the number of voters, it is possible for the
center to maintain such approximate winners; that is, upon a query at any time the center can
immediately return a candidate which is guaranteed to be an approximate winner with high
probability. We complement our protocols with lower bounds. Our results have implications
in various scenarios, such as aggregating customer preferences in online shopping websites or
supermarket chains and collecting votes from different polling stations of political elections.
1 Introduction
Elections are extensively being used to aggregate preferences of voters. Some elections are central-
ized, but others are carried out in distributed settings. Consider, for example, a supermarket chain
consisting of a large number of stores. Each store collects data on the purchases made in it, and
the managers at the chain headquarters might want to aggregate this data, to identify, for example,
the most popular items being sold. One solution would be to have a central database, collecting
all data from all stores, and to compute the most popular items on this centralized database. As
the number of customers might be huge, however, it might not be practical to do so. Further, as
the communication between the stores and the headquarters might be expensive, a more efficient
solution would be to have some computations being made locally at each store, and to develop a
protocol for efficient communication between the stores and the headquarters, to allow the man-
agers at the headquarters to know, at each point in time, what are the most popular items that
are being sold throughout the chain. As a concrete example, consider a car manufacturer wanting
to decide, in each point in time, which car models and colors to manufacturer.
∗A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS ’17) [FT17]. This full version contains all proofs, has improved upper bounds,
considers more voting rules, studies further lower bounds, and discusses several issues in more detail.
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A similar situation happens in online shopping websites, where buyers from all around the
world make purchases. As the design of modern websites is based on data centers, aggregating the
data concerning all buyers involves communicating in a distributed setting. Specifically, in order
to identify the current trends, and as communication between data centers might be expensive, it
is of interest to develop protocols for those data centers to communicate with a central entity.
Our model also catches scenarios of political polls and political elections. That is, in political
elections and in TV polls, it is usually the case that there are several polling stations, spread
around the country or the region. Then, in order to compute the results of the election (or the
intermediate results during the day when the poll is being held), the voters’ preferences from all
those polling stations are aggregated at some central station. For example, in the general political
elections held in Brazil in 2014, there were roughly 500,000 polling stations, with an average of 300
voters per station. In this situation, it is beneficial to have a protocol allowing the polling stations
to efficiently communicate with a central entity, allowing the central entity to maintain a good
estimate on the nation-wide (or region-wide) state of affairs.
In this paper, we model such situations as follows. We are considering an election whose
electorate is distributed into k sites. Assuming some common axis of time1, we have that at each
point in time, a new voter arrives and votes, and her vote is assigned to one of those k sites2. There
is some center which is able to directly communicate with each of the k sites. With respect to a
voting rule R, the goal of the center is to maintain, at any point in time, a candidate which is a
R-winner of the whole election (given an election E and a voting rule R, an R-winner of E is a
winner of E under R). More specifically, we are interested in designing communication-efficient
protocols, where the center is able, upon request at any time, to return a candidate which, with
high probability, is an R-winner.
As we are interested in sublinear communication, in addition to allowing mistakes to accrue
with some low probability, we will also use approximation. We call a candidate an -winner with
respect to a voting rule R, if by adding up to -fraction of voters, it can become an R-winner.
A more formal description of our model and a discussion on our notion of approximation is given
in Section 2. Previous works were concerned with bribery (where we are allowed to change an
-fraction of the voters), and margin of victory (where we are guaranteed that by changing an
-fraction of the voters, the outcome of the election shall remain unchanged), see Section 1.1 for
additional details on these notions. These notions are appropriate to deal with noisy data, or to
be used in scenarios where some external agent can influence the voters, thus change their votes.
Here, however, we are concerned with monitoring an election while minimizing the communication,
and the source of our errors is lack of information (rather than noise). Our approximation notion
fits better to our scenario, as a candidate is an -winner if it might become a winner under full
information. Furthermore, in monitoring an election we do expect more voters to come, thus, in
this aspect, an -winner is a candidate who might become a winner very shortly. Finally, as we
consider an ongoing election, changing previous votes is not an option. However, the information
on whether a candidate is an -winner is very valuable for making, e.g., real-time election policy
decisions.
1To avoid confusion, let us mention that, while we indeed speak about “time”, we do not consider any external
clocks (or, importantly, clocks accessible to the sites or the center). In particular, the voters can be assumed to come
at fixed intervals, whose speed is not known to the sites nor to the center.
2For convenience, we refer to voters as females, while the candidates are males.
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We concentrate on single-winner voting rules, and consider various voting rules, ranging from
approval-based rules and scoring rules, to tournament-based rules and round-based voting rules;
while we naturally cannot cover all voting rules available, we choose some of the more popular voting
rules as well as aim at choosing representative voting rules. Further, we develop some general
techniques for designing protocols for maintaining approximate winners in distributed elections,
which might be applicable to other voting rules and settings as well. We show how to apply
these techniques for the rules we consider. We discuss the effect of several parameters on the
communication complexity of the protocols we design; specifically, the effect that the number n of
voters, the number m of candidates, the required approximation , and the number k of sites have on
the amount of communication used by our protocols. We complement our communication-efficient
protocols with lower bounds.
As a by-product of our lower bounds for maintaining an approximate Plurality winner in dis-
tributed elections, we have two contributions which might be useful in other contexts. First, we
improve the state-of-the-art lower bound on the Count-tracking problem, which is a central
problem in distributed streams; this result is discussed in detail in Remark 3. In short, in the
Count-tracking problem, the task is to maintain a value which approximates the number of
items in a given distributed stream. In the regime where k ≥ 1/2, we improve the lower bound for
Count-tracking from Ω(k), proved by Huang et al. [HYZ12, Theorem 2.3], to Ω(k log n/ log k)
(see Remark 3). Second, we define a novel problem in multiparty communication complexity and
show a tight lower bound for it; in this problem, which we call the No Strict Majority problem,
we have several players, each possesses its own private binary string, and, by communicating bits,
the players should decide whether there is some index for which a majority of the players has 1 in
it. We prove a lower bound on the No Strict Majority problem, showing that the naive protocol
for this problem is essentially optimal: asymptotically, all the bits have to be transmitted. See
Section 5 for further details on our lower bounds and their implications to continuous distributed
monitoring and to multiparty communication complexity.
1.1 Related Work
We first review related work on sublinear algorithm in computational social choice, as the current
paper fits naturally within this line of research. Then we review papers on compilation complexity,
vote elicitation, and mention some connections between our notion of approximation to work on
control and bribery in elections (as well as to the concept of margin of victory). Finally, we give
an overview on the available literature on the continuous distributed monitoring model, which is
the computational model we use in the current paper (its formal definition is given in section 2).
Sublinear social choice. As the amount of data in general, and data concerning preferences in
particular, is consistently increasing, the study of identifying election winners using time or space
which is sublinear in the number of voters is receiving increasing attention. Specifically, the size
of some elections might be too big to process in linear time, thus algorithms with sublinear time
and/or space complexity are of interest.
In two papers, Bhattacharyya and Dey [DB15, BD15] study sampling algorithms for winner de-
termination as well as winner determination in the streaming model. In fact, some of our sampling-
based protocols are inspired by Bhattacharray and Dey [DB15]. In their model, they assume that
they are given an election in which the margin of victory is at least n (where n is the number of
voters); this means that the winner is guaranteed to remain such even if an adversary is allowed to
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change n votes. Given such elections, they evaluate the number of vote samples needed in order
to identify the winner with high probability. In our current paper, we have a different notion of
approximation and we do not assume such margins of victory (we formally describe our notion of
approximation in Section 2).
Remark 1. There is a mistake in the preliminary version of this work [FT17], which claims that
the sampling-based protocols are implied by the work of Bhattacharyya and Dey [DB15, BD15].
This is incorrect as our notion of approximation is different than theirs, specifically due to this
margin of victory assumption which in particular means that, while an approximate winner under
our definition always exists, this does not necessarily hold in their model.
In a recent paper, Dey et al. [DTvH17] study winner determination for several multiwinner
voting rules aiming at proportional representation. Dey and Narahari [DN15] study sampling
algorithms for estimating the margin of victory. These works deal with centralized elections,
while the current paper considers distributed elections. Another paper worth mentioning in this
context is the paper of Lee et al. [LGAL14] which argues for the importance of developing fast
communication-efficient protocols for computing winner in (centralized) streams; they also provide
a simple sampling-based algorithm for approximating Borda winners.
Not strictly considering sublinear social choice, but nonetheless concentrating on “huge elec-
tions”, in a recent paper, Csar et al. [CLPS17] study winner determination using the MapReduce
framework which may allow processing such elections efficiently by distributing the computation
among clusters of machines.
Compilation complexity. In a series of papers, Chevaleyre et al. [CLMRA09, CLMM11] and
Xia and Conitzer [XC10] define and study the compilation complexity of various voting rules; in
their model, the electorate is partitioned into two parts, and the general concern is the amount
of communication which needs to be transmitted between the two parts, in order to determine an
election winner. In compilation complexity there are no rounds of communication, as only one
message is being passed between the two parts. This stands in contrast to our protocols, which use
small amounts of communication due to their use of several rounds of communication between the
center and the sites.
Vote elicitation. There is quite an extensive literature which deal with vote elicitation [DN13,
CS02, LGAL14, Lee15]; these works provide algorithms for finding approximate winners under
various voting rules, by elicitating the voters’ preference orders. Conitzer and Sandholm [CS05]
study communication complexity for various voting rules, but they are interested in finding exact
winners, and do not consider approximations (indeed, usually their upper bounds are quite high,
e.g., linearly depend on the number of voters). Further, in their model, each voter acts as a site.
Approximate winners, margin of victory, and election control. In the current paper we
do not require our protocols to maintain exact winners, but are satisfied with approximate winners.
We formally define our notion of approximation in Section 2; roughly speaking, we consider a
candidate to be an approximate winner if it can become a winner if we are allowed to add a small
number of additional voters (where we can set their votes as we wish). Our notion of approximation
somehow resembles the vast amount of research done on electoral control and bribery in elections
(see, e.g., the survey by Faliszewski and Rothe [FR15]). In electoral control by adding voters, there
is usually a set of unregistered voters, and the question is whether it is possible to change the
outcome of the election, e.g., to have some predefined, preferred candidate to become a winner in
a new election, where a small number of those unregistered voters are added to the election.
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In bribery problems, such as shift bribery and swap bribery [EFS09], an external agent can
change the way some voters vote in order to have some predefined, preferred candidate to become
a winner. As observed by Xia [Xia12], the number of such changes that needs to be done in order
to make a specific candidate to become a winner (the so-called margin of victory), is a natural
notion of this candidate’s closeness to be a winner. Indeed, in this sense, our approximation notion
is related to those notions of control and bribery in elections.
Continuous distributed monitoring. The model of computation which we study in the cur-
rent paper is called the continuous distributed monitoring model, and is usually studied within
theoretical computer science and database systems. There is a fairly recent survey about this
model [Cor13], as well as quite extensive line of work studying various problems in this model, such
as sampling-based protocols [CMYZ12, TW11], protocols for approximating moments [CMY11,
ABC09], protocols for counting with deletions [LRV12] (interestingly, that paper specifically men-
tions elections as a motivation, but do not study it explicitly), heuristic protocols for monitoring
most-frequent items [BO03], and randomized protocols for counting the number of items in a dis-
tributed stream and finding frequent items [HYZ12]. In the current paper we complement this line
of work by studying winner determination in this model.
2 Preliminaries
We begin by providing preliminaries regarding elections and voting rules, continue by describing
our notion of approximation, and finish by discussing our model concerning continuous monitoring
of distributed streams. We use standard notions from computational complexity. For n ∈ N, we
denote the set {1, . . . , n} by [n].
2.1 Elections and Voting Rules
An election E = (C, V ) consists of a set of candidates C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a collection of voters
V = (v1, . . . , vn). We consider both approval elections, where voters cast approval ballots, and
ordinal elections, where voters cast ordinal ballots.
Specifically, in approval elections, each voter is associated with her set of approved candidates,
such that vi ⊆ C. We say that vi approves candidate c if c ∈ vi (and disapproves it otherwise). In
ordinal elections each voter is a total order vi over C.
A single-winner voting rule R is a function that gets an election E and returns a set R(E) ⊆ C
of co-winners of that elections, such that c is a winner of the election E under R if c ∈ R(E).
Next we define our voting rules of interest. We ignore issues of tie-breaking; specifically, we
assume an arbitrary tie-breaking order which works in our favor, such that a candidate c is a winner
if there is some fixed tie-breaking that makes him a winner.
We begin with approval-based voting rules and scoring rules, continue with tournament-based
voting rules, and then discuss round-based voting rules.
2.1.1 Approval-based Rules and Scoring Rules
Plurality, t-Approval, and Approval. Under Approval, each voter approves a subset of the
candidates (that is, it is held in approval elections), and the score of a candidate is the number
of voters approving him. The candidates with the highest score tie as co-winners. t-Approval is
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similar to Approval, but with the restriction that each voter shall approve exactly t candidates
(that is, |vi| = t; we assume that t ≤ m/2). Plurality is a synonym for 1-Approval, that is, where
each voter approves exactly one candidate.
Borda. Borda is the archetypical scoring rule. Under Borda, a voter ranking a candidate in
position j is giving it m− j points, and the candidates with the highest score tie as co-winners.
2.1.2 Tournament-based Voting Rules
Cup. The Cup voting rule is defined via a balanced binary tree T with m leaves, such that
there is exactly one leaf for each candidate. Starting from the leaves, in a bottom-up fashion, each
non-leaf node is associated with the candidate which wins in the pairwise election held with only
the two candidates corresponding to the two children of that node. Finally, the candidate which
gets assigned to the root of T is declared the winner of the election.
Copeland and Condorcet. The Copeland score of a candidate c is the number of other
candidates c′ 6= c for which a majority of voters prefer c to c′. Under Copeland, the candidates with
the highest Copeland score tie as co-winners. A Condorcet winner is a candidate with Copeland
score m − 1. Under Condorcet, a Condorcet winner is selected as a winner if it exists; otherwise,
all candidates tie as co-winners.
2.1.3 Round-Based Voting Rules
Plurality with run-off. Plurality with run-off proceeds in two rounds. In the first round, it
selects two candidates with the highest Plurality scores, where the Plurality score of a candidate
is defined as the number of voters ranking him first. In the second round, it considers only those
two candidates selected in the first round and selects as a winner the one which is preferred to the
other by the larger number of voters.
Bucklin. Bucklin also proceeds in rounds. In round i ∈ [m], it computes, for each candidate c,
the number of voters ranking c among their top i choices. Then, if there is a candidate with a strict
majority of the voters ranking him among their top i choices, then such a candidate is selected as
a winner; otherwise, a new round begins.
2.2 Our Notion of Approximation
Since we will be interested in designing protocols where the center cannot see the full election,
it will not be possible to guarantee that our protocols will find exact winners; therefore, we will
be satisfied with protocols which are guaranteed to find approximate winners. There are several
possibilities for defining approximate winners of elections; in this paper we consider -winners.
Roughly speaking, an -winner is a candidate which is not far from being the winner of the election
in the sense that he might become a winner after the arrival of only few additional new voters. A
more formal definition follows.
Definition 1 (-winner). A candidate c is an -winner in an election E (with n voters) under some
voting rule R if it can become a winner under R by adding at most n additional voters to E. That
is, if there exist an election E′, where E ⊆ E′ and |E′ \ E| ≤  · n such that c ∈ R(E′).
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Figure 1: Illustration of our model.
Indeed, we view the definition of an -winner as a definition of approximation, as the lower  is,
the closer an -winner is to a real winner. As we will design our protocols to compute -winners,
the lower  would be, their guaranteed results would become closer and closer to real winners.
Our approximation notion seems particularly relevant to our setting (as compared to, e.g., the
notion used by Bhattacharyya and Dey [DB15, BD15]), for the following reasons. First, we do not
assume a margin-of-victory assumption, namely that some candidate is a clear winner. Second, in
distributed vote streams we expect more voters to arrive in the future, thus we are interested in
candidates which might become winners in the near future: These are exactly the -winners. (As
a side note, we mention that in political elections such a knowledge might worth much to these
candidates, as it can help them decide on when to spend their campaigning funds.)
2.3 Our Model of Computation
In our computational model we have one center and k sites. The center and the sites are arranged
in a star-shaped network, centered at the center, such that the center has a direct communication
link to each site but two sites cannot communicate directly.
We assume some axis of time, t1, . . . , tn, and a stream of voters v1, . . . , vn, such that voter vi
comes at time ti. Each voter is assigned to exactly one site, such that each site is aware only of the
subset of voters which are assigned to it. We stress that the time is not known to either the center
or the sites. Such a stream is called a distributed stream. Figure 1 illustrates the model.
We mention that our model of computation might be seen as the model of computation assumed
in the study of Continuous Distributed Monitoring, when instantiated for vote streams (and not
general, abstract streams). See the Related Work section for more details on this subject.
We are interested in designing communication-efficient protocols, whose goals are to allow the
center to declare, at any point in time, a candidate c which is, with constant probability (say, 0.9),
an -winner (see Section 4 for a discussion on higher probabilities).
A protocol is defined via the messages which the center and the sites send to each other, and
can consist of several rounds. The protocol shall be correct not only at the end of the stream (which
is usually the case in streaming algorithms), but shall be correct at any point in time. As it is the
custom in protocols operating on distributed streams, we describe our upper bounds in terms of
words of communication, where we assume that a word contains log n bits.
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Voting rule Frequencies Checkpoints Sampling
Plurality O((−1
√
k + k) log n· logm)
t-Approval O((−1
√
kt+ k) log tn· logm) O (k (m log k + log n)) O(−2 log(2t) + k)(log (mt )+ log n)
Approval O((−1
√
km+ k) logmn· logm) O (k (m log k + log n)) O((−2 logm+ k)(m+ log n))
Borda O((−1
√
km+ k) logmn· logm) O (k (m log k + log n)) O((−2 logm+ k)(m logm+ log n))
Condorcet O((−1
√
km2 + k) logmn· logm) O (k (m log k + logm · log n)) O((−2 logm+ k)(m logm+ log n))
Copeland O((−1
√
km2 + k) logmn· logm) O (k (m2 log k + log n)) O((−2 logm+ k)(m logm+ log n))
Cup O((−1
√
km2 + k) logmn· logm) O (k (m log k + logm · log n)) O((−2 logm+ k)(m logm+ log n))
Run Off O((−1
√
km2 + k) logmn· logm) O (k log n) O((−2 + k)(m logm+ log n))
Bucklin O
(
(−1
√
km log2m+ k) O(k logm (m log
k
 + log n)) O((
−2 logm+ k)(m logm+ log n))
· logmn· logm)
Table 1: Overview of our results.  is the required approximation, k is the number of sites, m is the
number of candidates, and n is the number of voters. There are three columns of upper bounds,
where the first is for protocols based on counting frequencies, the second is for protocols based on
checkpoints, and the third is for sampling-based protocols. The results in the first column and
in the third column correspond to randomized protocols, while the results in the second column
correspond to deterministic protocols. For Plurality with run-off, the second protocol is actually a
hybrid between checkpoints to (deterministic) frequency count. For Cup and for Condorcet, one
might also use the checkpoints protocol of Copeland.
2.4 Useful Results from Probability Theory
For the sampling based protocols, we will use the following bound.
Theorem 1 (Chernoff Bound). Let X1, . . . , Xs be a sequence of s i.i.d random variables in [0, 1].
Let X =
∑
iXi and let µ = EX. Then, for any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1:
Pr[|X − µ| ≥ δµ] < 2 exp(−δ2µ/3) .
Another useful result, which will be the main building block for our sampling-based protocols,
is the following.
Lemma 1. Let X1, . . . , Xs be i.i.d random variables in [0, 1] with mean p. Let X =
∑
iXi and let
q = 1sX. Then, for s ≥ 32 log(2δ ) it holds that
Pr[|q − p| ≥ ] < δ .
Proof. Set µ = E[X] = s · p. Using Chernoff Bound (i.e., Theorem 1), it follows that:
Pr [|q − p| ≥ ] = Pr
[
|X − µ| ≥ 
p
· µ
]
≤ 2 exp
(
−
(

p
)2
· µ/3
)
≤ 2 exp (−2s/3) ≤ δ .
3 Algorithmic Techniques
The naive protocol, where each site sends to the center a message for every voter which arrives
to it, clearly solves our problem, however it uses communication which is linear in the number of
voters. For example, for ordinal ballots, it communicates O(n · m logm) bits, since m logm bits
are sufficient for sending a single vote. In this paper we are interested in protocols which use
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significantly less communication, namely communication which is polylogarithmic in the number
of voters.
In this section we provide high level descriptions of three algorithmic techniques which are
useful for developing protocols for maintaining approximate winners in distributed vote streams.
Accordingly, in Section 4 we demonstrate how to realize and instantiate those algorithmic techniques
as concrete protocols for maintaining approximate winners for various specific voting rules.
3.1 Protocols Based on Counting Frequencies
In the Frequency-tracking problem, we are given a distributed stream where, instead of voters,
the items of the stream come from a known universe of items. The goal is for the center to maintain,
for each item type in the distributed stream, a value which approximates the frequency of that item
type. More formally, let us denote the items of the stream by v1, . . . , vn and consider m different
item types, such that item i (for i ∈ [n]) is of type j (for j ∈ [m]) if vi = j. Let us denote the
frequency of item type j by f(j) = |{i : vi = j}|. A protocol solving the Frequency-tracking
problem guarantees that with constant probability, simultaneously for every item type j, the center
can maintain a value f ′(j) such that f ′(j) ∈ f(j)± n.
Estimating the frequencies of item types is a fundamental problem in distributed streams (in
fact, also in centralized streams). A deterministic protocol for Frequency-tracking, using
O(−1k log n) words of communication is known [YZ13], and it is known that it is tight as well.
Moreover, there is a randomized protocol which uses O((−1
√
k + k) log n log 1δ ) words of commu-
nication [HYZ12]. 3 Formally, the protocol guarantees that for every j ∈ [m] and every n, after
the arrival of n voters, Pr[f ′(j) ∈ f(j)± n] ≥ 1− δ. In particular, by setting δ = 1/poly(m) and
applying union bound, we get that for every n, Pr[∀j, f ′(j) ∈ f(j) ± n] ≥ 1 − 1poly(m) . The
communication complexity in this case is O((−1
√
k + k) log n · logm).
Many voting rules operate by counting points for candidates, thus, it can be seen as if those
voting rules actually count frequencies of, say, approvals of each candidate. It turns out that, indeed,
it is sometimes possible to reduce the problem of maintaining an -winner under such voting rules
to the problem of maintaining approximate frequencies.
During the description of our results for specific voting rules, in Section 4, we will usually use the
randomized version of the Frequency-tracking protocol, the only exception being the hybrid
protocol for Runoff, for which we will use the deterministic version.
3.2 Protocols Based on Checkpoints
Protocols based on checkpoints are deterministic in nature, and the general idea behind such
protocols is as follows. Assume that the center knows an -winner c of the election containing the
first n voters. Then, the crucial observation is that, until the number of voters reaches (1+ )n, the
center can declare c as an O()-winner. This suggests protocols where the center only updates its
declared candidate whenever the number of voters multiplies by an (1+Ω())-fraction. Such points
in time will be called checkpoints. Between two checkpoints, the center will declare the previous
3Notice that Huang et al. [HYZ12] consider only situations where k ≤ −2, thus their bounds read differently;
nevertheless, O((−1
√
k + k) logn · log 1
δ
) is the communication complexity of their protocol.
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estimation as the current -winner. This intuition is formulated in the following lemma, the proof
of which appears in Appendix A. 4
Lemma 2. Let R be some voting rule described in Section 2.1. Let E = {v1, . . . , vn} and E′ =
E ∪ {vn+1, . . . , vn+q}, where q ≤ 4n, be two elections. If candidate c is an 4 -winner w.r.t E, then
c is an -winner w.r.t E′.
In order to identify the checkpoints, the center shall be able to count the number of voters
arriving so far. Fortunately, there is an efficient deterministic protocol for solving the Count-
tracking problem, which uses O(λ−1k log n) words [YZ13]; in the Count-tracking problem,
the center shall maintain a value n′ such that n′ ∈ n± λn, where n is the actual number of items
in the distributed stream.
Now we have all the ingredients for our generic protocol. Specifically, the center will maintain a
value n′ using a Count-tracking protocol with precession parameter λ = 12 . Each time when n
′
exceeds (1+λ)i for the first time5, for some i, the center will initiate a static subprotocol to identify
an 4 -winner c of the election so far. The center will declare c as -winner until the next checkpoint.
We argue that c is indeed an -winner. Consider a step in time n. Then the center’s estimation n′
of the number of voters is at least (1−λ)n. In particular, it necessarily had a “checkpoint” at time
n′′, for n′′ ≥ 1−λ1+λn. Thus n ≤ (1 + 3λ)n′′ = (1 + 4)n′′. By Lemma 2, as c was 4 -winner at time n′′,
it is also -winner at time n.
As the estimation n′ is bounded by (1 + λ)n, the number of checkpoints is bounded by
log1+λ ((1 + λ)n) = O(log n/λ) = O(log n/). Assuming that it is possible to compute an -winner
using O(z) words, a protocol based on checkpoints would then need O((k + z)−1 log n) words of
communication. As z will be at least Ω(k), we would get O(z · −1 log n).6
During the description of our results for specific voting rules, in Section 4, we will describe only
the static protocol in each protocol based on checkpoints. For simplicity of presentation, we will
compute -winner instead of 4 -winner as actually needed.
3.3 Protocols Based on Sampling
Instead of sending all voters to the center, as the naive protocol does, it is natural to let each site
send only some of the voters arriving to it. Specifically, we would like the center to have a uniform
sample of the voters. Cormode et al. [CMYZ12] describe a protocol for maintaining a sample of
s items chosen uniformly at random from a distributed stream; it’s communication complexity is
O((k + s) log n). Since we are sampling voters, we need to take into account the communication
needed to send each of the sampled voters. Specifically, in approval elections (where the voters cast
approval ballots), we need log 2m bits per voter. Since we count the communication complexity in
words, each of which contains log n bits, we need dlog 2m/ log ne ≤ 1 + m/ log n words per voter.
Similarly, in ordinal elections (where the voters cast ordinal ballots), we need (logm!) bits per
voter, thus dlogm!/ log ne ≤ 1 +m logm/ log n words per voter.
4While some of the ideas in the proof might fit naturally in the main text, the proof considers each voting rule
studied in this paper separately, and thus it is slightly repetitive, and thus deferred to the appendix.
5In fact, the Count-tracking protocol of [YZ13] only increases its estimation as time go by.
6Huang et al. [HYZ12] provide a randomized protocol for Count-tracking which uses O(
√
k−1 logn) bits of
communication. As z will be greater than O(k), using randomization will not reduce the total asymptotic communi-
cation.
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But how much samples are needed in order to determine an -winner with high probability?
Our main building block would be Lemma 1 (see Section 2) and our general framework will be as
follows. For each voting rule, we will use Lemma 1 to argue that, with s samples, chosen uniformly
with repetitions, we can determine an -winner with high probability. Then, assuming that we
need w words of communication for each voter, using an efficient sampling protocol [CMYZ12], as
discussed above, we will get a communication protocol with complexity O((k + s)w · log n). (As
we use asymptotic analysis, it will be enough to find an O()-winner and to adjust the parameters
accordingly.)
4 Communication-efficient Protocols
Our upper bounds are summarized in Table 1. We begin with approval-based rules and scoring
rules, continue with tournament-based rules, and then discuss round-based rules. Before we present
our specific upper bounds, the following remark, concerning the success probability of our protocols,
is in place.
Remark 2. Notice that we state our results for protocols which are correct with some constant
probability, say 0.9. One can always achieve arbitrary high probability 1 − δ, as follows, and
depending on the general technique used:
• For protocols based on counting frequencies, following the discussion in Section 3.1, one can
get failure probability δ by replacing the logm term with a log mδ term in the communication
complexity.
• Protocols based on checkpoints are deterministic anyhow.
• For protocols based on sampling, we mention that, as can be seen from the corresponding
proofs, the increase of the required sampling size needed for increasing the success proba-
bility is quite small. Specifically, the number of samples will increase: in t-Approval to
O(−2 log(2tδ )), in (Plurality with) Run Off to O(
−2 log(1δ )), and in all other voting
rules to O(−2 log(mδ )).
4.1 Approval-based Rules and Scoring Rules
Let us begin with Plurality, as arguably the simplest voting rule. In Plurality, a vote in a distributed
vote stream is associated with one candidate out of the m candidates participating in the election,
and the goal is for the center to maintain a candidate c such that the highest number of voters vote
for c, or at least it is at most n-far from being such a candidate. Equivalently, a distributed stream
for Plurality contains m item types (one item type for each candidate). Given an approximate
frequency for each type (that is, an approximate number of voters voting for each candidate), the
center can safely declare the candidate with the highest approximate frequency.
The next result follows by realizing a straight-forward protocol based on counting frequencies,
as described in Section 3.1; notice that we use ′ = /2.
Theorem 2. There is a protocol for Plurality-winner-tracking which uses O((−1
√
k +
k) log n· logm) words.
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a, b, c
=⇒ a
a, b, d b
c
a
b
d
Figure 2: Reducing t-Approval to Plurality, for t = 3. Notice that two t-Approval voters become
six Plurality voters.
Proof. We use the efficient protocol for Frequency-tracking [HYZ12] with ′ = /2. This allows
the center to maintain, for each candidate c, a value which is guaranteed to be at most 2n-far from
the real number of voters voting for c. The center would declare the candidate c for which the
approximate frequency is the highest.
Let us denote the real frequency of a candidate c by f(c) (which equals its Plurality score), and
its approximate frequency computed by the Frequency-tracking protocol by f ′(c). For each
c′ 6= c, it holds that
f(c′) ≤ f ′(c′) + 
2
n ≤ f ′(c) + 
2
n ≤ f(c) + n
where the first and third inequalities follows from the /2-approximation and the second from our
choice of c. Therefore, we conclude that c is an -winner, as required.
We go on to consider t-Approval, where each voter specifies t candidates which she approves.
We provide three protocols, based on counting frequencies, checkpoints, and sampling, respectively.
The protocol based on counting frequencies simulates each voter by t voters, each approving only
one candidate; then, it uses a protocol for Plurality.
Theorem 3. There are three protocols for t-Approval-winner-tracking, for t ≤ m/2. Respec-
tively, the protocols use O((−1
√
kt+ k) log tn· logm), O (k (m log k + log n)), and
O(−2 log(2t) + k)(log
(
m
t
)
+ log n) words of communication.
Proof. For the first protocol, we reduce t-Approval to Plurality, as follows, and as depicted in
Figure 2. Each site, upon receiving a voter v which approves t candidates, instead of considering
the voter v, creates and considers t voters, v1, . . . vt, such that voter vi (for i ∈ [t]) is set to approve
the ith approved candidate of v. For example, a voter approving {a, b, d} would be reduced to three
voters, approving a, b, and d, respectively.
The reduced election has n′ = nt voters, and will be executed with precision parameter ′ = /2t.
Consider a candidate c which is an ′-winner in the reduced election; we argue that c is an -winner
in the original election. Indeed, we can add n voters, each approving c, while for each other
candidate c′, at most n/2 of them approve c′ (as t ≤ m/2); thus, the relative score of c increases
by n/2 = ′n′. As c is ′-winner in the reduced election, this is sufficient. By Theorem 2, the
communication used is O((′−1
√
k + k) log n′· logm) = O((−1√kt+ k) log tn· logm).
The second protocol is based on checkpoints. We describe the static protocol for computing
an -winner. The center initiates communication with all sites, asking from each site to send an
approximate score for each candidate. That is, each site, for each candidate c, sends the number
of voters approving c, rounded to the closest multiplication of n/k. Such rounding is enough,
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since, summing up the possible errors from all k sites, the center would have a value which is at
most n/2-far from the real score. Thus, the candidate c with the highest approximated score will
indeed be an -winner. Each site should communicate log(k ) bits per candidate. Thus, the total
communication is bounded by kdm log
k

logn e ≤ O(k(1 +
m log k

logn )). The bound follows.
For the third protocol, we will show that s = 24
2
ln 2tδ sampled voters, chosen uniformly at
random (with repetitions), are enough to determine an -winner with failure probability at most δ.
As we can communicate each voter using log
(
m
t
)
bits, the bound follows. Consider such a sample
of s voters, and, for a candidate c, let Xci be an indicator for the event that the i’s sampled voter
approved c. Let Xc = ns
∑s
i=1X
c
i , and denote by Y
c the actual number of voters that approved c in
the original election. Set µ = E [
∑
iX
c
i ] = s · Y
c
n . Using Chernoff bound (Theorem 1 in Section 2),
we have that:
Pr
[
|Xc − Y c| ≥ 
2
n
]
= Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
Xci − s ·
Y c
n
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2s
]
= Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
Xci − µ
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2 nY cµ
]
≤ 2 exp
(
−
( 
2
n
Y c
)2 · µ/3)
= 2 exp
(
− 
2
12
· ns
Y c
)
.
By union bound, we have that:
Pr
[
∃c s.t. |Xc − Y c| ≥ 
2
n
]
≤ 2
∑
c
exp
(
− 
2
12
· ns
Y c
)
≤ 2t · e− 
2s
12 ≤ δ ,
where the second inequality follows from Claim 1 below, by setting λ = 
2·ns
12 and noting that
(Y c1 , . . . , Y cm) lies in the convex hall of the set A described there. The center will return a
candidate c with maximal Xc. Correctness follows by the same arguments as in the frequency-
count protocol.
Claim 1. Consider the set Nm of points with m integer coordinates. Let A ⊂ Nm contain exactly
those points in Nm for which the value of exactly t coordinates is n, while the value of all their
other m− t coordinates is 0. Let λ ≥ 2n. Then, for any arbitrary point (x1, . . . , xm) in the convex
hall of A, it holds that:
m∑
i=1
e
− λ
xi ≤ t · e−λn .
Proof. Consider the function f(x) = e−
λ
x and notice that its second derivative is
(f(x))′′ =
(
e−
λ
x
)′′
=
(
λ
x2
· e−λx
)′
= −2λ
x3
· e−λx + λ
2
x4
· e−λx = λ
x3
· e−λx ·
(
λ
x
− 2
)
.
Hence, f is convex in the domain [0, n] ⊆ [0, λ/2]. Set fˆ(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑n
i=1 f(xi). As sum of
convex functions is also convex, fˆ is convex in the domain [1, n]n, which in particular contains the
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a  b  c
=⇒ a
c  a  b a
b
c
c
a
Figure 3: Reducing Borda to Plurality. Notice that two Borda voters become six Plurality voters.
convex hull of A. Since fˆ is convex function, the maximum value in the convex hall achieved in a
point of A. We conclude that:
m∑
i=1
e
− λ
xi = fˆ (x1, . . . , xm) ≤ max
(y1,...,ym)∈A
fˆ(y1, . . . , ym) = t · e−λn .
For Approval, where the set of approved candidates of each voter can be arbitrary, thus upper
bounded by the number m of candidate, we proceed similarly to t-Approval. Naturally, we have m-
factors instead of t-factors in our bounds. (Specifically, in the first protocol the size of the reduced
election is n′ = mn and in the second protocol we sample slightly more voters.) Other than that,
in fact, Approval is even a bit easier than t-Approval, as by using n voters, we can increase the
relative score of a candidate c by n (since we can add n voters all of which approve only c).
Theorem 4. There are three protocols for Approval-winner-tracking. Respectively, the proto-
cols use O((−1
√
km+ k) logmn· logm), O (k (m log k + log n)), and O((−2 logm+ k)(m+ log n))
words of communication.
We go on to consider ordinal elections. Specifically, next we consider the Borda rule, for which
we describe three protocols.
Theorem 5. There are three protocols for Borda-winner-tracking. Respectively, the protocols
use O((−1
√
km+k) logmn· logm), O(−1k(m log(k/)+ log n)), and O((−2 logm+k) (m logm+
log n)) words of communication.
Proof. We start by discussing the impact of adding voters. For an arbitrary candidate c, consider
two voters where one voter is ranking c first and then ranks the other candidates in an arbitrary
order, and another voter is ranking c first and then ranks the other candidates in reverse order.
Adding these two voters causes an increase to the score of c by 2(m−1) while the score of all other
candidates increases by m − 2. Thus, by adding n voters, we can increase the relative score of c
by nm/2.
The first protocol is based on reducing Borda to Plurality, similarly to the first protocol stated
in Theorem 3. Specifically, we begin by reducing Borda to Plurality, as follows, and as depicted
in Figure 3. Each site, upon receiving a voter v with preference order c1  . . .  cm, instead of
considering the voter v, creates and considers
∑
j∈[m]m− j < m2 voters, such that for j ∈ [m], it
creates m− j voters, each approving cj . For example, a voter v : a  b  d would be transformed
into three voters, approving a, a, b, respectively.
In the reduced election we have n′ < m2n voters, where n is the number of voters in the original
election. We use the protocol for Plurality described in Theorem 2 with ′ = /(4m). Let us denote
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the real frequency of a candidate c in the reduced election by f(c) and its computed approximate
frequency by f ′(c). The error is bounded by |f ′(c)− f(c)| ≤ ′n′ < 4m · nm2 = nm4 . Since by
adding n voters we can increase the relative score of the chosen candidate by nm/2, we are done.
The second protocol is based on checkpoints, thus below we describe the static subprotocol used
in each checkpoint. Similarly to the second protocol in Theorem 3, each site sends an approximation
of the Borda score of each candidate rounded to the closest multiplication of nm/k. Hence the
subprotocol uses O(k(1 + (m log k )/(log n))) words, while the combined error for the Borda score
estimation of each candidate is nm/2.
For the third protocol, we will show that s = O(−2 log mδ ) sampled voters, chosen uniformly at
random (with repetitions), are enough to determine an -winner with failure probability at most δ.
As we can communicate each voter using log(m!) bits, the bound follows. For a candidate c, letXci =
αi
m , where αi is the score that candidate c gets from the i’s sampled voter. Let X
c = n·ms
∑s
i=1X
c
i ,
and denote by Y c the score of the candidate c in the election. Set µ = E
[
1
s
∑
iX
c
i
]
= 1n·mY
c. Using
Lemma 1 we have that
Pr
[
|Xc − Y c| ≥ 
4
· n ·m
]
= Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣1s∑
i
Xci − µ
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 4
]
≤ δ
m
,
and hence by union bound it follows that Pr
[∃c s.t. |Xc − Y c| ≥ 4 · n ·m] ≤ δ. The center will
return a candidate c with maximal Xc. The accuracy of the protocol follows from arguments given
in the analysis of the frequency-count protocol.
4.2 Tournament-Based Rules
In this section we consider Condorcet winners and the Copeland voting rule. The rules we consider
below are built upon the tournament defined over the election by considering head-to-head contests
between all pairs of candidates. The first protocol for Copeland proceeds by approximating, for each
pair of candidates c1 and c2, the number of voters preferring c1 to c2. Having these approximate
counts, we will be able to identify an -winner under Copeland. if there is a candidate c which is
preferred to all other candidates, then the center shall declare c as the Condorcet winner.
Theorem 6. There are three protocols for Copeland-winner-tracking. Respectively, the proto-
cols use O((−1
√
km2+k) logmn· logm), O (k (m2 log k + log n)), and O((−2 logm+k)(m logm+
log n)) words.
Proof. For the first protocol, we reduce each voter, corresponding to a total order over the candi-
dates, to O(m2) items; specifically, the reduced distributed stream will contain items of O(m2) item
types, where for each pair of candidates c1 and c2 we have a different type, denoted by (c1, c2). The
reduction proceeds as follows. Each site, upon receiving a voter v which specifies a linear order,
instead of considering the voter v, creates and considers
(
m
2
)
items, such that if v prefers c1 to c2,
then we create an item (c1, c2) (notice that this is an ordered tuple). The reduction is depicted in
Figure 4. For example, a voter v : a  b  d would be transformed into three items, (a, b), (a, d),
and (b, d).
The reduced distributed stream has n′ =
(
m
2
) · n items and O(m2) types of items. For two
candidates c1 and c2, let N(c1, c2) denote the number of voters preferring c1 to c2. Now we can use
a protocol based on counting frequencies (see Section 3.1), with ′ = /m2, to let the center maintain,
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a  b  c
=⇒ (a, b)
a  c  b (a, c)
(b, c)
(a, c)
(a, b)
(c, b)
Figure 4: Reducing a linear order to frequencies.
for each pair of candidates c1 and c2, a value N
′(c1, c2) such that N ′(c1, c2) ∈ N(c1, c2) ± ′n′ ⊆
N(c1, c2)± n/2.
Let Sc′(c, E) be the number of candidates c′ such that N ′(c, c′) ≥ n/2− n/2 in the election E.
We denote by Sc(c, E) the (real) Copeland score of candidate c in elections E. The center declares
as an -winner a candidate c with the highest value of Sc′(c, E). Note that, for every candidate c′,
it holds that Sc(c′, E) ≤ Sc′(c′, E); this is so since the error in the computed frequency is bounded
by n/2, while for the declared winner c, it holds that there are at least Sc′(c, E) candidates c′ such
that N ′(c, c′) ≥ n− n.
Next we argue that c is indeed an -winner. We add n/2 voters which rank c on top and then
the other candidates in arbitrary order, and another n/2 voters which rank c on top and then the
other candidates in reverse order. Denote the modified election, with these additional voters, by E′.
Then, for every c′, N(c, c′) increased by n; thus Sc(c, E′) ≥ Sc′(c, E). Moreover, the number of wins
of any other candidate c′ does not increase. Hence Sc(c′, E′) ≤ Sc(c′, E) ≤ Sc′(c′, E) ≤ Sc′(c, E).
The communication complexity follows by the discussion given in Section 3.1; specifically, it is
O((′−1
√
k + k) log n′· logm) = O((m2
√
k + k) log(nm)· logm).
The second protocol is based on checkpoints, and thus below we describe the static subprotocol
used in each checkpoint. For every pair of candidates, c1 and c2, every site sends the center the
number of voters preferring c1 over c2, rounded to the closest multiplication of n/2k. In each
checkpoint, a candidate achieving estimated score higher that n2 − n2 for the maximal number of
times (that is, for the largest number of other candidates) is declared a winner. As the error in
each head-to head contest is upper-bounded by k · n2k = n2 , correctness follows by similar lines as
given above in the proof of the frequency-count protocol. As there are m2 quantities to estimate,
each site sends O
(
1 +
m2 log k

logn
)
words. The total communication follows.
For the third protocol, we will show that s = O(−2 log mδ ) sampled voters, chosen uniformly at
random (with repetitions), are enough to determine an -winner with failure probability at most
δ. As we can communicate each voter using log(m!) bits, the bound follows. For two candidates
c, c′, let X(c,c
′)
i be an indicator for the event that the i’s sampled voter prefers c over c
′. Let
N ′(c, c′) = ns
∑s
i=1X
(c,c′)
i , and denote by N(c, c
′) the actual number of voters preferring c over c′
in the original election. Set µ = E
[
1
s
∑
iX
(c,c′)
i
]
= 1nN(c, c
′). Using Lemma 1 it follows that
Pr
[∣∣N ′(c, c′)−N(c, c′)∣∣ ≥ 
2
· n
]
= Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣1s∑
i
X
(c,c′)
i − µ
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2
]
≤ δ
m2
.
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By union bound, with probability at least 1− δ, for every pair of candidates we have that∣∣N ′(c, c′)−N(c, c′)∣∣ < 
2
· n.
Let Sc′(c, E) be the number of candidates c′ such that N ′(c, c′) ≥ n/2 − n/2 in the election E.
The center declares as an -winner a candidate c with the highest value of Sc′(c, E). The accuracy
of the protocol follows from arguments given in the analysis of the frequency-count protocol.
We go on to consider the Cup rule, which differs from Copeland in several aspects. The first
aspect is that, in order to prove that some estimated candidate c is indeed an -winner, it is not
enough to add c arbitrary voters ranking c last, but rather a more subtle construction of voters is
needed. The second aspect is that, intuitively, while in Copeland we had to send communication
regarding all pairs of candidates, in Cup it is enough to send communication only regarding some
pairs of candidates, as given by the binary tree corresponding to the “head-to-head” contests
performed for finding the winner under Cup.
Theorem 7. There are three protocols for Cup. Respectively, the protocols use O((−1
√
km2 +
k) logmn· logm), O (k (m log k + logm · log n)), and O((−2 logm+ k)(m logm+ log n)) words.
Proof. Let T be an implementation of the binary tree of the Cup election: There are n− 1 ordered
pairs P of candidates (corresponding to the head-to-head “contests”), such that the winning can-
didate in each such pair goes up in the tree. In particular, every election E which agrees with the
tree T on P , will have the root of T as its Cup-winner. We argue that there is an order piP over the
candidates such that, if (c, c′) ∈ P , then c will appear before c′ in piP . Indeed, consider a directed
graph G with the candidates as its vertices and P as its edges. G is acyclic and thus a topological
order of G will provide us with the desired order pi. Later we will use this order pi as a preference
order. Now we will proceed to describing the protocols.
Our first protocol is based on counting frequencies, and is similar to the corresponding Copeland
protocol. We estimate the frequencies of all head-to-head contests (using the same precision and
communication). To return a winner, we simply run a Cup tournament (with the appropriate,
given tree), using the estimations N ′(c, c′) instead of the real values NE(c, c′). As a result, we have
a set P of n − 1 ordered pairs. To prove correctness, it will be enough to show that by adding
additional n votes it will hold, for every (c, c′) ∈ P , that NE′(c, c′) ≥ NE′(c′, c). Indeed, following
the analysis of the frequency count of Copeland, with high probability for every pair of candidates
c, c′ we have that |N ′(c, c′)−NE(c, c′)| ≤ n/2. Recall the order piP described at the beginning of
the proof, and notice that by adding n voters with preference orders as piP it will hold, for every
(c, c′) ∈ P , that
NE′(c, c
′) = NE(c, c′) + n ≥ NE(c′, c) = NE′(c′, c) ,
as required.
The second protocol is based on checkpoints7, thus below we describe the static subprotocol
carried-out in each checkpoint. The subprotocol has logm rounds, corresponding to the height of
the binary tree associated with the Cup protocol. In each round, the center asks each site to provide
approximate values of the pairs currently at interest. Supplied with these approximate values, the
7The protocol described here is useful if we assume that logm · logn ≥ m2 log k

. If this is not the case, then we
can use instead the communication protocol of Copeland.
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center then computes the winner of each head-to-head contest, and continue to the nodes further
up the tree. At the end, the center declares the winner of the highest node in the tree.
More concretely, for every pair of candidates of interest c, c′, each site sends the center the
number of voters preferring c over c′, rounded to the closest multiplication of n/2k. As the error
in each head-to-head contest is upper-bounded by k · n2k = n2 , correctness follows by similar lines as
given above in the proof of the frequency-count protocol described above. There are logm rounds,
where at round i, each site sends 2logm−i values, each requiring log 2k bits. Thus, the total number
of words in a checkpoint is:
k ·
logm∑
i=1
⌈
2logm−i · log 2k
log n
⌉
≤ k ·
logm∑
i=1
(
1 +
2i · log 2k
log n
)
= O
(
k ·
(
logm+
m · log k
log n
))
,
and total communication follows.
The third protocol is based on sampling and is similar to the Copeland sampling protocol. We
use the same communication, and hence we insure that with high probability, for every pair of
candidates c, c′ it holds that |N ′(c, c′) −N(c, c′)| < 2 · n. Correctness now follows by similar lines
as in the frequency-count protocol.
Finally, we consider the Condorcet voting rule. In order to declare a candidate c as a Condorcet
-winner, it is enough to insure that, by adding n voters, every other candidate c′ 6= c loses to at
least one other candidate in the head-to-head contest (and thus, either c can become a Condorcet
winner in this way, or there will be no Condorcet winner at all, in which case c can be returned).
A candidate c which is either Copeland or Cup -winner has this property. We conclude that every
protocol for Copeland as well as every protocol for Cup is in particular a protocol for Condorcet.
Corollary 1. There are three protocols for Condorcet-winner-tracking. Respectively, the
protocols use O((−1
√
km2 + k) logmn· logm), O (k (m log k + logm · log n)), and O((−2 logm +
k)(m logm+ log n)) words.
4.3 Round-based Rules
In this section we consider two round-based voting rules; we begin with Plurality with run-off and
then continue to Bucklin. For Plurality with run-off we provide there protocols, one of which is a
“hybrid” protocol, specifically combining checkpoints and sampling. Intuitively, hybrid protocols
fit naturally with round-based voting rules, which, informally speaking, are themselves “hybrids”
of voting rules.
Theorem 8. There are three protocols for Plurality-with-run-off-winner-tracking. Re-
spectively, the protocols use O((−1
√
km2 + k) logmn· logm), O (k−1 log n) and
O((−2 + k)(m logm+ log n)) words.
Proof. The first protocol is based on counting frequencies. We combine the protocol for Plural-
ity, described in the proof of Theorem 2, with the protocol for Copeland, described in the proof
of Theorem 6. Specifically, the Plurality protocol maintains a frequency count for the plurality
score of each candidate with accuracy 6 . The Condorcet protocol, for every two candidates c1, c2,
maintains a frequency count for the number of times c1 wins c2 with accuracy

3 . Following the
analysis in Theorem 2 and Theorem 6, the communication needed is O((−1
√
k+k) logmn· logm)+
18
O((−1
√
km2 + k) logmn· logm) = O((−1√km2 + k) logmn· logm). When calculating the winner,
the center identifies two candidates c1, c2 with the highest estimated Plurality scores f
′(c) using
the protocol for Plurality. Denoting by f(c) the real Plurality score, for every c′ 6= c1, c2 it holds
that
For i ∈ {1, 2}, f(c′) ≤ f ′(c′) + 
6
n ≤ f ′(ci) + 
6
n ≤ f(ci) + 
3
n . (1)
Next, the center uses the protocol for Condorcet to decide which of these two candidates it shall
declare as an -winner. Assume, without loss of generality, that it declares c1 as the winner. Then,
by adding 23n (resp.
1
3n) voters ranking c1 (resp. c2) on top, we can guarantee that c1 and c2
indeed have the highest Plurality score while c1 wins c2 in the head-to-head contest.
The second protocol is a “hybrid” protocol which combines checkpoints and frequency count.
During the protocol we maintain an estimated frequencies of the Plurality score of each candidate
as in the first protocol (which we execute with precision 6). Next we describe the subprotocol
executed in each checkpoint. At each checkpoint, we use the Plurality protocol to identify two
candidates c1 and c2 with the highest (approximated) Plurality score. Given c1 and c2, the center
collects from all sites the exact number of voters preferring c1 over c2, and declares as a winner
the one which is preferred by more voters. Correctness follows as by adding 2n voters ranking
c1 on top, and

2n voters ranking c2 on top, we guarantee that c1 and c2 indeed have the highest
plurality score (formally, this follows from equation 1) while the winner between the two remains
unchanged. The subprotocol uses 2k words of communication, thus the total communication in all
the checkpoints is O
(
k−1 log n
)
. For the frequency count we will use the deterministic protocol
with O
(
k−1 log n
)
communication. Therefore, in total we have a deterministic protocol with
O
(
k−1 log n
)
communication.
For the third protocol, we will show that s = O(−2 log 1δ ) sampled voters, chosen uniformly at
random (with repetitions), are enough to determine an -winner with failure probability at most δ.
We will use two sets of independent samples, S1 and S2, each of size s/2 = O(
−2 log 1δ ). According
to the proof of Theorem 3 for the case of t = 1, the set of sampled voters S1 is sufficient for us
to determine the plurality score of each candidate with accuracy 6 . Let c1 and c2 by the two
candidates with the highest plurality score in S1. Next we use S2 to determine the number of
times c1 wins c2 (with accuracy

3 as in our protocol for Copeland; see Theorem 6), and return the
candidate who wins in the head-to-head contest (in S2). Correctness follows by similar lines to our
frequency-count protocol.
For Bucklin, we suggest three protocols; one is based on counting frequencies, the second is
based on checkpoints, while the third is a sampling-based protocol.
Theorem 9. There are three protocols for Bucklin-winner-tracking. Respectively, the proto-
cols use O((−1
√
km log2m+k) logmn· logm), O (−1 · k · logm · (log n+m log k )), and O((−2 logm+
k)(m logm+ log n)) words.
Proof. For simplicity we assume that m is even (otherwise we can add one dummy candidate).
By averaging arguments, a Bucklin winner is necessarily found within the first m/2 rounds. We
start with a discussion regarding the impact of adding voters. Let c be an arbitrary candidate and
consider adding two voters, each ranking c on top, and ranking the other candidates in reverse
orders. As a result, the score of c increases by 2 for each level j ≤ m/2, while the status of each
candidate c′ 6= c is only weaker (thus, if c′ does not have a majority at level j before the addition,
then it will also not have a majority after the addition).
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Figure 5: An example for the reduction performed in the protocol for Bucklin. Specifically, a voter
v : c1  c2  c3  c4 is considered, which is reduced to the following stream elements: (c1, 0, 0),
(c1, 1, 0), (c2, 0, 1), (c2, 1, 0), (c3, 0, 2), (c3, 1, 1), (c4, 0, 3), (c4, 1, 1).
The first protocol is based on counting frequencies. It begins by reducing the distributed vote
stream into a different distributed stream. Intuitively, the idea is to consider binary divisions of the
positions between 1 to m; for example, if we know the frequency of some candidate c in the first
half positions (between position 1 and position m/2) as well as the frequency of it in the positions
between position m/2 and position 3m/4, then we know its frequency between position 1 and 3m/4.
Thus, we will have a different distributed stream for each binary division of the m positions, and
we will use these to know the (approximated) Bucklin score of each candidate.
Formally, we do as follows. Each site, upon receiving a voter v, instead of considering the voter,
creates for each candidate cl (l ∈ [m]), the items (cl, i, j) for each i ∈ [0, logm − 1] and for each
j ∈ [0,m/2i − 1] for which it holds that v ranks cl between the (j · 2i + 1)’th position and the
((j+ 1) · 2i)’th position. The idea is that we can recover the approximate number of voters ranking
each c at the first j positions using logm approximate counters of these items. See Figure 5 for an
illustrating example.
The protocol initiates a Frequency-tracking protocol on the reduced distributed stream
with ′ = /(2m log2m). This will give us approximate values on the number of items of each type
in our reduced distributed stream. Let us denote, for a candidate ci and position j (for i ∈ [m]
and j ∈ [m]), the number of voters ranking ci at any position j′ ≤ j by N(ci, j). Then, we
can approximate each of the values N(ci, j) by adding logm different approximated frequencies,
computed by the Frequency-tracking protocol (on the reduced stream). This is, informally,
the reason why we reduced each original voter in to the items we reduced to: given those items,
it is enough to add logm different approximated frequencies in order to approximate the value of
N(ci, j); then, as we will see below, bounding the error can be done in a finer way, since the error
is accumulated only in logm different frequencies, and not in m such (which would be the case
otherwise).
Using these approximations of N(ci, j), denoted by N
′(ci, j), we are now able to simulate
Bucklin; specifically, the center finds the minimum j for which there is at least one ci for which
N ′(ci, j) ≥ n2 − n2 . Next we show correctness. The size of the reduced distributed stream is
n′ = nm logm, since each voter is transformed into m logm items, specifically logm per each
candidate. To approximate the value N(ci, j) we add up logm approximate frequencies, each of
which can be wrong by at most ′n′ = n/2 logm; thus, the value of N ′(ci, j) can be wrong by
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at most n/2. Therefore, in each level j′ < j where we do not find a winner, there is indeed no
candidate with a majority. Finally, according to the discussion in the begging of the proof, n
additional voters can indeed make our chosen candidate a winner.
The second protocol is based on checkpoints, and thus below we describe the static subprotocol
carried-out in each checkpoint. Each checkpoint contains logm rounds, where in each of these logm
rounds, the center is performing an approximate binary search to find the first j for which there is
at least one candidate ci for which the estimation of N(ci, j) is greater than
n
2 − n8 , and declares
this ci as an -winner. In the round when some index j is considered, each site sends to the center
the number of voters ranking each candidate c among the first j positions, rounded to the closest
multiplication of n/4k. Thus, the center can estimate each N(ci, j) with precision
n
8 , as needed.
Let c be our declared candidate, which is declared at round j. Then, according to the discussion
in the beginning of the proof, by adding 4 votes, the declared candidate c will have majority of
the votes at round j, while no c′ 6= c will have majority of the votes for j′ < j. In particular
the candidate c is an 4 -winner. Correctness follows by the discussion in Section 3.2. As at most
kdm log 4k/logn e words of communication are required in each round of the sub-protocol, and there are
at most logm rounds, the total communication is bounded by
O
(
log n

· logm · kdm log 4k/
log n
e
)
≤ O
(
k · logm

·
(
log n+m log
k

))
.
For the third protocol, we will show that s = O(−2 log mδ ) sampled voters, chosen uniformly
at random (with repetitions), are enough to determine an -winner with failure probability at
most δ. As we can communicate each voter using log(m!) bits, the bound would follow. So, for
each candidate c and j ∈ [m], let X(c,j)i be an indicator for the event that the i’s sampled voter
ranks c among the top j positions. Set N ′(c, j) = ns
∑s
i=1X
(c,j)
i to be an estimation for N(c, j) -
the number of voters ranking c at among the top j positions. Using Lemma 1 we conclude that
Pr
[|N ′(c, j)−N(c, j)| ≥ 2 · n] ≤ δm2 . By union bound, with probability at least 1− δ for every all
c, j, it holds that |N ′(c, j)−N(c, j)| < 2 · n. The center now finds the first j for which there is at
least one candidate c for which N ′(c, j) ≥ n2 − n2 , and declares this c as an -winner. Correctness
follows by the same arguments as in the frequency count protocol.
5 Lower Bounds
In this section we providing lower bounds. The main result is an almost tight lower bound (up to a
factor of log k· logm) for Plurality-winner-tracking. We mention that our lower bound holds
already for Plurality with 2 candidates and that it also improves the state-of-the-art lower bound
for Count-tracking (refer to Theorem 10 for our lower bound and to the remark which follows
it for its application to Count-tracking). Later in this section we describe a lower bound for
deterministic protocols for Approval-winner-tracking, which is of some interest mainly since
it is almost tight for Approval-winner-tracking and also shows that some dependency on the
number m of candidates is required.
5.1 Randomized Lower Bound for Plurality-winner-tracking
Before we describe the randomized lower bound for Plurality-winner-tracking, we mention
that it is applicable to all other voting rules we consider, via the following reduction.
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Lemma 3. Let R be some voting rule described in Section 2.1. A protocol for R-winner-
tracking which uses C words of communication implies a protocol for Plurality with 2 candidates
which uses C words of communication.
Proof. Assuming a protocol for a voting rule R, we can use it as a black-box for solving Plurality
with 2 candidates; below we describe such a reduction.
Let R be a voting rule considered in this paper. Let P be a protocol for R which uses C words
of communication. We construct a protocol P ′ for Plurality with two candidates, a and b, which
uses P as a black-box. Specifically, we describe the operation of P ′ for the different R’s considered
in this paper; the general idea of the reduction is similar for all these voting rules, namely, given
a Plurality election to construct a R election where the R winners are equivalent to the Plurality
winners. The specifics of the reduction slightly vary between the voting rules considered. We denote
by a and b our two Plurality candidates.
If R is Approval, then, for each Plurality voter which arrives and approves some candidate, say
a, we create a voter approving only a. Notice that the the Approval winners are equivalent to the
Plurality winners.
If R is one of {Borda, Condorcet, Copeland, Cup, Plurality with run-off, Bucklin}, then, for
each Plurality voter which arrives and approves a, we create a voter ranking a on top and then b;
similarly, for each Plurality voter which arrives and approves b, we create a voter ranking b on top
and then a. Notice that, in these cases, the R winner are equivalent to the Plurality winners.
IfR is t-Approval, then we shall create 2t−2 new candidates c1, . . . , c2t−2, and, for each Plurality
voter which arrives and approves a, we create one voter ranking a, c1, . . . , ct−1 on top, and another
voter ranking a, b, ct, . . . , c2t−3 on top; similarly, for each Plurality voter which arrives and approves
b, we create one voter ranking b, c1, . . . , ct−1 on top, and another voter ranking b, a, ct, . . . , c2t−2 on
top; Notice that in this case also, the R winner are equivalent to the Plurality winners.
We mention that in our lower bound for Plurality which we describe next, we assume, as it is
usual in studying distributed streams, that there is no spontaneous communication; that is, the
center can initiate communication only as a result of receiving a message from the sites, and each
site can initiate communication only as a result of receiving a stream item or a message from the
center.
Now we are ready to state our lower bound for Plurality; the proof of the corresponding theorem
(that is, Theorem 10) appears at the end of the section, and is based on Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
Recall that for Plurality-winner-tracking, Theorem 2 provides an upper bound of O((−1
√
k+
k) log n· logm).
Theorem 10. Any randomized protocol for Plurality-winner-tracking uses at least Ω((−1
√
k+
k) log n/ log k) words of communication, even when there are only two candidates.
The next lemma shows a lower bound when k < −2.
Lemma 4. If k < −2, then any randomized protocol for Plurality-winner-tracking uses at
least Ω(−1
√
k log n) words of communication, even when there are only two candidates.
Proof. We reduce Count-tracking to Plurality-winner-tracking. To this end, we as-
sume, towards a contradiction, that there is a protocol for Plurality-winner-tracking with
o(−1
√
k log n) communication complexity, and describe a protocol with the same communication
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complexity for Count-tracking. For k < −2 this leads to a contradiction, since there is a lower
bound of Ω(−1
√
k log n) for Count-tracking where k < −2 [HYZ12, Theorem 2.4].
The distributed stream for Count-tracking contains items of only one type, and a protocol
for Count-tracking maintains a value n′ such that n′ ∈ n±n, where n is the number of items in
the distributed stream. We treat those items as voters, each of which is approving the candidate c1.
The general idea of the reduction is for the center to simulate another site, called a ghost site
(we use this name to emphasize that it is not a “real” site, but just a “virtual” site which is being
simulated by the center), to which the center will send ghost voters (again, not real voters, but only
simulated by the center). The center will simulate a protocol for Plurality with voters approving
c1 going to the k “real” sites, and simulated voters approving c2 going to the ghost site.
Specifically, the center has three parts. The first part is a center for a Plurality-winner-
tracking protocol operating on k + 1 sites. The second part is a site in a Plurality-winner-
tracking protocol; this is the ghost site. The third part is for the center to inspect the Plurality-
winner-tracking protocol from above, and (using knowledge about the current winner) to send
voters approving the candidate c2 to the ghost site.
Let us denote the number of voters voting for c1 (c2) by s(c1) (respectively, s(c2)). Set δ = /10.
The protocol for Plurality-winner-tracking will work with respect to approximation δ, and
will consist of k + 1 sites.
Next we describe the logic of the third part of the center. The estimation for Count-tracking
will be est = (1 + 3δ)s(c2) (note that only the ghost site receives voters approving c2, hence the
center knows s(c2) exactly).
Before there is any communication from the (real) sites to the center, we set s(c2) = 0. Then,
at some point in time there will be some communication from the sites to the center indicating that
some voters approving c1 arrived; specifically, the first part of the center would declare c1 as the
winner of the election. More generally, our protocol works in phases, where a phase starts when
the center “flip”s its estimation; that is, the (first part of the) center changes the estimation for
the Plurality winner from c2 to c1. When such a flip occurs, the center sends some ghost voters
(approving c2) to the ghost site until s(c2) = (1 + 3δ)
i (for some i) and a flip (from c1 back to c2)
occurs. (That is, we send ghost voters until a flip occurs and then send some additional voters until
we reach a power of 1+3δ; reaching this power of 1+3δ is actually not needed, but it does not affect
the communication complexity and it makes the analysis cleaner.) We assume, as is usually done
in distributed streams, that communication and internal computation happens instantly. Thus, we
have that c2 is always the winner of the Plurality-winner-tracking protocol. This finishes the
description of the reduction.
Next we argue that our estimation (for Count-tracking) is accurate. Specifically, we will
show that s(c1) ≤ est ≤ (1 + )s(c1). As c2 is always the winner, it always holds that s(c2) +
δ(s(c1) + s(c2)) ≥ s(c1). Since δ < 1/10 (as  < 1), it holds that:
s(c1) ≤ 1 + δ
1− δ · s(c2) < (1 + 3δ) · s(c2) = est .
Fix s(c2) = (1 + 3δ)
i. Note that when s(c2) was equal to (1 + 3δ)
i−1, the protocol for Plurality-
winner-tracking considered c1 as the winner. Hence, s(c1)+ δ(s(c1)+(1+3δ)
i−1) ≥ (1+3δ)i−1;
therefore,
s(c1) ≥ 1− δ
1 + δ
(1 + 3δ)i−1 ≥ (1 + 3δ)
(1 + 3δ)3
(1 + 3δ)i ≥ est
1 + 
.
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Note that, until the next flip, s(c1) can only grow, while our estimation remains unchanged. Hence,
it will still hold that est ≤ (1 + )s(c1). Finally, we have that the communication of our protocol is
bounded by o(δ−1
√
k + 1 log(s(c1) + s(c2))) = o(
−1√k log n), which contradicts the lower bound
for Count-tracking discussed above.
The next lemma is especially interesting for k ≥ −2.
Lemma 5. Any randomized protocol for Plurality-winner-tracking uses at least Ω(k log n/ log k)
words of communication, even when there are only two candidates.
Proof. We assume that  < 13 . Consider a protocol for Plurality-winner-tracking which is
correct with constant probability on every input. Next we describe a distributed stream of voters
which come to the sites. Specifically, the stream consists of s phases. Let x1 = 1, y1 = 1,
xi = (1 + 3) · k · yi−1, and yi = yi−1 + xi. During the i’s phase, xi voters will go to each site
and vote for the candidate c(i mod2). Note that after the i’s phase, exactly yi voters voted at each
site. The total number of votes for c(i mod2) is at least k · xi, while the total number of votes for
c(i−1 mod2) is at most k · yi−1. In particular, c(i mod2) is a unique -winner.
Note that
yi = yi−1+xi = yi−1+(1 + 3)·k·yi−1 = (1 + (1 + 3) · k)·yi−1 = (1 + (1 + 3) · k)i−1·y1 ≤ (3k)i−1 ,
thus the total number of voters is bounded by n = k · ys < (3k)s. In particular, s = Ω( lognlog k ).
Next consider the j’s site Sj during the phase i. Let Yi,j be the event that some communication
between the center and Sj occurs. Let Zi,j be the event that the center initiates communication
with Sj . Let Xi,j be the event that Sj initiates communication with the center, conditioned on the
event that the center does not initiate communication with Sj (that is, Yi,j conditioned on Zi,j).
We argue that E[Xi,j ] = Ω(1). Before the i’s phases starts, c(i−1 mod2) is the unique -winner.
Consider an alternative scenario where, after the end of the i− 1’s phase, xi voters come to Sj
(and vote for c(i mod2)), while no additional voters arrive. In this alternative scenario the center will
not initiate communication with Sj , as from its point of view nothing have changed since the end
of the (i− 1)’s phase (since it did not receive any new messages). Note also that in the alternative
scenario, c(i mod2) is the unique -winner. This is since
k · yi−1 + (k · yi−1 + xi) = k · yi−1 + (k · yi−1 + (1 + 3) · k · yi−1)
= k · yi−1 (1 + (1 + (1 + 3)))
= k · yi−1
(
1 + 2+ 32
)
< xi.
Thus, if Sj will not initiate communication with the center, then, in the alternative scenario,
the center would not hold the right estimation both at the end of the i− 1’s phase and at the end
of the i’s phase. This is so since it will have the same estimation, while there are different unique
-winners at those times. Therefore, the probability that the center is right in both of these times
is bounded by Pr [Xi,j ]. As the center has constant probability to have the right estimation twice,
we conclude that E[Xi,j ] = Ω(1).
Let us go back to our original scenario. Set Pr [Zi,j ] = α. Then, we have that:
E [Yi,j ] = E [Zi,j ] + Pr
[
Zi,j
]
E [Xi,j ]
= α+ (1− α) · Ω(1) = Ω(1) .
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The total communication during the whole protocol is lower bounded by∑s
i=1
∑k
j=1 E [Yi,j ] = Ω(sk) = Ω
(
k logn
log k
)
.
We are ready to prove Theorem 10.
Proof of Theorem 10 . If k < −2, then Lemma 4 provides us with a lower bound of Ω(
√
k
 log n) =
Ω
(
(
√
k
 + k)
logn
log k
)
. Otherwise (k ≥ −2), using Lemma 5 we get a lower bound of Ω(k lognlog k ) =
Ω
(
(
√
k
 + k)
logn
log k
)
.
Remark 3. Notice that Lemma 5 implies a Ω(k lognlog k ) lower bound for the Count-tracking
problem. The Count-tracking problem is a central problem in distributed streams, where the
goal is to continuously maintain a counter which is at most n far from the actual number of items
arriving to the stream. For the Count-tracking problem in the regime where k ≥ −2, Huang et
al. [HYZ12, Theorem 2.3] give a lower bound of Ω(k).
Lemma 5 relates to Count-tracking, As there is a reduction from Plurality-winner-
tracking with two candidates to Count-tracking: to implement a protocol for Plurality-
winner-tracking with two candidates it is sufficient to use two protocols for Count-tracking
with ′ = /2, one for each candidate, and to report as winner the candidate corresponding to the
larger counter.
Thus, we conclude that Lemma 5 implies a Ω(k lognlog k ) lower bound for the Count-tracking
problem, thus improving the state of the art for this problem.
5.2 Deterministic Lower Bound for Approval-winner-tracking
Next we prove a lower bound on the communication of a deterministic protocol for Approval-
winner-tracking. Recall the checkpoints-based deterministic protocol described within the proof
of Theorem 4: the protocol has O(−1 log n) checkpoints, and in each checkpoint, each site sends
log(4k ) bits per candidate. Thus, if we measure the communication in bits (instead of words
as in Theorem 4), we get that the total cost of that protocol is O
(
−1 log n ·m · k · log(4k )
)
=
O
(
m·k·log( k

)
 · log n
)
. In this section we prove Theorem 11, showing that protocol (the one from
Theorem 4) to be almost optimal in the deterministic regime.
Theorem 11. For  < 1/16, and for large enough m, any deterministic protocol for Approval-
winner-tracking uses at least Ω
(
mk
 · log
(
n
k
))
bits of communication.
The proof of Theorem 11 is based on a reduction from a new problem in communication com-
plexity ; specifically, the variant of communication complexity which is sometimes referred to as
multiparty communication complexity. In this variant we have k players, denoted by P1, . . . , Pk,
and each player Pj possesses a (possibly different) string xj ∈ {0, 1}m. The objective is to compute
the outcome of a function f : {0, 1}m×k → {0, 1} on the combine inputs of the players (formally, on
the concatenation of the xj strings). The players follow some protocol, and can communicate by
broadcasting bits. Specifically, when a player broadcasts a bit b, all other players receive b and we
add 1 to the communication count. The cost of a protocol is the maximum number of exchanged
bits, over all possible inputs. The deterministic communication complexity of the function f , de-
noted by D(f), is the minimal cost of a deterministic protocol that computes f . For additional
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details and overview of the field we refer to the textbook of Kushilevitz and Nisan [KN97] or to the
book chapter by Razborov [Raz11].
Next we define the No Strict Majority problem: NSM, in short. In it, we have 2k players and a
parameter  > 0. Each player Pj has an m-bit string Aj ∈ {0, 1}m. The objective is to figure out
if there is an index i such that a strict majority of the players has 1 in that index. Formally,
NSM2k,m, (A1, . . . , A2k) =

0 ∃i |{j | i ∈ Aj}| ≥ (1 + ) k
1 ∀i |{j | i ∈ Aj}| ≤ k
Don’t Care Otherwise
,
where by “Don’t Care”, we mean that any outcome of the protocol is legitimate.
We denote a conjunction of l instances of NSM2k,m, by
∧l
i=1NSM2k,m,. That is, we have 2k
players, each of which is given l strings of m bits each (formally, Pj gets Aj,1, . . . , Aj,l); the outcome
shall be 1 if and only if, for every index s ∈ [1, l] and i ∈ [1,m], it holds that |{j | i ∈ Aj,s}| ≤ k.
An equivalent way to think about
∧l
i=1NSM2k,m, is that each of the players gets a binary l ×m
matrix and we accept if there is no cell for which a majority of the players has a 1 in.
The proof of the following lemma could be found in Appendix B. We mention that, as far as we
know, the
∧l
i=1NSM2k,m, problem was not considered in the literature, hence the following lemma
is novel and might be useful in other contexts besides our current context, that of communication-
efficient protocols for monitoring election winners.
Lemma 6. D
(∧l
i=1NSM2k,m, 1
4
)
= Ω(mkl) .
To prove Theorem 11, next we show how the communication complexity of
∧l
i=1NSM2k,m, 1
4
implies a lower bound on the communication of Approval-winner-tracking. The general idea,
similarly to the idea underlying the lower bound described in Lemma 5, is to exploit the fact
that, in any point in time, the center should be able to produce an answer without any additional
communication. Specifically, we will have l = Ω(km log
n
k ) rounds, such that by sampling the center
in l different points of time we can determine
∧l
i=1NSM2k,m, 1
4
.
Proof of Theorem 11. For the sake of simplicity, during the proof we will consider also non-integer
number of voters; this issue can easily be fixed by proper rounding, while introducing only a constant
overhead to the number of voters.
Consider an instance of
∧l
i=1NSM2k,m, 1
4
, where the input of player Pj is
{
Asj
}l
s=1
∈ {0, 1}m×l.
We will use a protocol for Approval-winner-tracking with m candidates, 2k sites, and precision
parameter  to solve
∧l
i=1NSM2k,m, 1
4
. By Lemma 6,
∧l
i=1NSM2k,m, 1
4
requires Ω(lmk) communi-
cation. This in turn will imply a lower bound for the communication complexity of Approval-
winner-tracking.
Our reduction is as follows. Each player acts as a site, and will simulate the arrival of voters in
some order, to be specified shortly. Player P1 will act also as server (this is possible as we assume
broadcast communication). We denote the number of voters that approve candidate i at site j by
(vi)j , and the total number of voters, across all sites, approving candidate i by vi =
∑
j(vi)j . The
reduction has several phases. We first describe the first phase and later generalize it to describe
how the rth phase is executed.
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• First phase: Before the first phase starts, the situation is that each candidate is approved
by 0 voters at each site. The first phase have 3 stages, as follows.
– Vote simulation: each site j simulates that a voter approving A1j arrives.
– Validation: the center computes a winner q, then it collect (vq)j from all the sites
(players). If vq =
∑2k
j=1(vq)j > k, then it determines that the solution for the first
instance is 0. Otherwise it determines that the solution is 1.
– Reset: each site j simulates that a voter approving A1j comes.
• rth phase: Set xr = (1 + 32)r−2 and yr = 32xr > 161−8xr. Before the rth phase starts, the
situation is that each site already received exactly 2 · xr voters, such that each candidate was
approved by exactly xr voters at each site. The rth phase has 3 stages:
– Vote simulation: each site j simulates that yr voters appeared, all approving A
r
j .
– Validation: the center computes a winner q, then it collect (vq)j from all the sites
(players). If vq =
∑2k
j=1(vq)j > 2k · xr + k · yr, then it determines that the solution for
the rth phase is 0. Otherwise it determines that the solution is 1.
– Reset: each site j simulates that yr voters appeared, all approving Arj .
In total, the number of voters used throughout the protocol is n = 2k ·2 ·xl+1 = 4k ·(1+32)l−1.
In addition to the protocol for Approval-winner-tracking, we also used O(k) communication in
each phase to compute the number of votes the winner got; to see why O(k) bits of communication
suffices for each phase, notice that in phase r, in the validation stage, each site sends to the center
the number of voters voted for the q’th candidate. As there are only two options for this number
(xr, xr + yr), one bit of communication suffices for each site, thus we have O(k) additional bits
of communication in total for each phase. Thus, the total communication our protocol uses, in
addition to the Approval-winner-tracking protocol, is O(lk).
Next we argue that we indeed compute the right answer for each of the l instances of
∧l
i=1NSM2k,m, 1
4
.
Note that, at the time of the second step in the rth phase, exactly 2xr + yr voters arrived at each
site, accumulating to a total of nr = 2k · (2xr + yr) voters. Fix some r ∈ [1, l] and consider first
the case where there exists an index i such that
∣∣∣{j | i ∈ Ajr}∣∣∣ ≥ (1 + 14) k. In particular, the i’s
candidate was approved by at least vi ≥ 2k ·xr+(1+ 14) ·k ·yr voters. Hence, the Approval protocol
will return an index q s.t. vq +  · nr ≥ vi. As yr > 161−8xr it holds that 14 · k · yr >  · nr, and
in particular vq ≥ vi −  · nr > 2k · xr + k · yr. We conclude that, in this case, the algorithm will
compute the correct answer in the rth phase.
Otherwise, if for every index i, we have that
∣∣∣{j | i ∈ Arj}∣∣∣ ≤ k, then no matter which index q
the algorithm for Approval-winner-tracking will return, since the center will check it and will
find out that vq ≤ 2k · xr + k · yr. Hence, again, it will compute the right answer.
Note that the number of voters used throughout the protocol is n = 4k · (1 + 32)l−1, hence
l = 1+ log1+32
n
4k = Ω
(
1
 log
n
k
)
. As, other then the protocol for Approval-winner-tracking,
we used only O(lk) bits, while we solved
∧l
i=1NSM2k,m, 1
4
, a problem requiring Ω(mkl) bits, we
conclude that Approval-winner-tracking requires at least
Ω(lmk)−O(lk) = Ω(lmk) = Ω
(
mk

· log
(n
k
))
,
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bits. In the first equality we used the fact that m is large enough.
6 Discussion and Outlook
In this paper we studied communication-efficient protocols for maintaining approximate winners
in distributed vote streams. We have shown several general techniques for designing such proto-
cols (namely, sampling-based protocols, protocols based on checkpoints, and protocols based on
counting frequencies), and demonstrated their usefulness for various single winner voting rules.
Indeed, based on these general techniques, For each of the rules we considered here, we have de-
signed several communication-efficient protocols, and analyzed their communication complexity.
We complemented our protocols with lower bounds.
As a further contribution, we view our paper as a bridge between issues and ideas from artifi-
cial intelligence (specifically, multiagent systems and computational social choice) and techniques
and methods from theoretical computer science and database systems (specifically, streaming and
sampling algorithms and distributed continuous monitoring). We hope that more fruitful research
can be done by bridging between those fields.
Below we first discuss several aspects which are somehow hidden in the technical part of the
part. Specifically, we begin with a discussion on deterministic protocols, showing that, while
the technical part of the paper concentrates on randomized protocols, communication-efficient
deterministic protocols for monitoring election winners in distributed streams exist as well. Then,
as in this paper we developed several protocols for each voting rule considered, we provide a
discussion on how to choose which protocol to use at which scenario, depending on the specific
parameters of the problem at hand. We end this section by mentioning some directions for future
research.
6.1 Deterministic Protocols
While in this paper we concentrated on randomized protocols, it turns out that some of our protocols
are already deterministic or can be made deterministic with some slight modifications. To us, this
is quite surprising: for example, there are usually no efficient deterministic algorithms operating
on centralized streams. Specifically, as we show next, while there are no natural deterministic
equivalents to our sampling-based protocols (since, informally speaking, a deterministic equivalent
to sampling would basically need to sample the whole electorate), our other protocols can generally
be made deterministic.
Indeed, protocols based on checkpoints are already deterministic. Further, protocols based on
counting frequencies can use a deterministic protocol for Frequency count which usesO(−1k log n)
words of communication [YZ13]. Correspondingly, the increase in the communication complexity
is by at most a factor of
√
k. Notice that the corresponding deterministic protocols still maintain
only approximate solutions.
6.2 Choice of Protocol
A closer look at our upper bounds reveals that the choice of which protocol to use for which voting
rule crucially depends on the relationships between the various parameters; specifically, as a rule
of thumb, it looks as if the choice of which protocol to use depends on the relation between k and
1/−2; specifically, if k < 1/−2, then protocols based on counting frequencies or on checkpoints
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shall be used, while if k ≥ 1/−2, then sampling-based protocols achieve better communication
complexity. We believe that both cases make sense; for example, in a supermarket chain with 4000
stores, requiring approximation of  = 1/100 would put us in the first case, while requiring  = 1/10
would put us in the second case.
6.3 Future Directions
Below, we discuss several directions for future research.
6.3.1 Improved Bounds and More Rules
While we considered quite a variety of voting rules in this paper, there are further interesting rules
to consider, ranging from single-winner voting rules such as Kemeny, Young, Dodgson, Schulze,
Maximin, and Ranked pairs, to multiwinner voting rules such as committee scoring rules, including
Chamberlin–Courant and Monroe. Further, there are still some gaps between our upper bounds
and lower bounds; closing those gaps is a natural direction for future research.
6.3.2 Simulations and Heuristics
Our focus in the current paper, besides bridging between the study of computational social choice
within the field of artificial intelligence and the topic of continuous distributed monitoring within
database systems and theoretical computer science, is a theoretic study of communication-efficient
protocols for maintaining election winners in distributed elections.
We believe that a theoretic study is important but also appreciate the possibility of validating
our theoretical findings by performing simulations. Thus we view an experimental follow-up to the
current paper as an important and interesting future work. One shall be careful in choosing input
instances and evaluation methods, and there is also some hope that efficient heuristics (for which
the theoretical complexity might not be impressive) outperform our protocols for certain scenarios
and distributions.
6.3.3 Constrained Resources
In this paper, we measured the complexity of our protocols only in terms of their communication
cost. It is natural to consider other resources, especially studying various trade-offs between space,
time, and communication. We mention that, for example, our sampling-based protocols do extend
to situations where the computational power of the sites is very limited, since sampling from a
distributed stream can be done with sites which have only logarithmic space [CMYZ12]. Our
checkpoint-based protocols, however, generally assume linear space (in m) for each site.
6.3.4 Various Restrictions
In this paper we have concentrated on worst-case notions: first, we assumed that voters are arbi-
trarily (thus, adversarially) assigned into the sites; second, we did not assume any structure on the
electorate itself. Since there might be better real-world situations, it is natural to study protocols
for elections drawn from, say, Mallow’s model or the Urn model, as well as to study situations
where the voters are, say, uniformly assigned into the sites. Of course, studying protocols for elec-
tions which adhere to some domain restrictions, such as single peaked elections and single crossing
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elections would be natural and interesting as well. Indeed, there is hope more efficient protocols
exist for such restrictions.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Robert Krauthgamer for inspiring discussions.
References
[ABC09] C. Arackaparambil, J. Brody, and A. Chakrabarti. Functional monitoring without
monotonicity. In Automata, Languages and Programming, pages 95–106. 2009. 5
[BD15] A. Bhattacharyya and P. Dey. Fishing out winners from vote streams. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1508.04522, 2015. 3, 4, 7
[BO03] B. Babcock and C. Olston. Distributed top-k monitoring. In Proceedings of the 2003
ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data (CDM ’03), pages
28–39, 2003. 5
[CLMM11] Y. Chevaleyre, J Lang, N. Maudet, and J. Monnot. Compilation and communication
protocols for voting rules with a dynamic set of candidates. In Proceedings of the 13th
Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK ’11), pages
153–160, 2011. 4
[CLMRA09] Y. Chevaleyre, J. Lang, N. Maudet, and G. Ravilly-Abadie. Compiling the votes of a
subelectorate. In Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (IJCAI ’09), pages 97–102, 2009. 4
[CLPS17] T. Csar, M. Lackner, R. Pichler, and E. Sallinger. Winner determination in huge
elections with MapReduce. In Proceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI ’17), pages 451–458, 2017. 4
[CMY11] G. Cormode, S. Muthukrishnan, and Ke. Yi. Algorithms for distributed functional
monitoring. ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG), 7(2):21, 2011. 5
[CMYZ12] G. Cormode, S. Muthukrishnan, K. Yi, and Q. Zhang. Continuous sampling from
distributed streams. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 59(2):10, 2012. 5, 10, 11, 29
[Cor13] G. Cormode. The continuous distributed monitoring model. ACM SIGMOD Record,
42(1):5–14, 2013. 5
[CS02] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Vote elicitation: Complexity and strategy-proofness.
In Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI ’02),
pages 392–397, 2002. 4
[CS05] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Communication complexity of common voting rules.
In Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’ 05), pages
78–87, 2005. 4
30
[DB15] Palash Dey and Arnab Bhattacharyya. Sample complexity for winner prediction in
elections. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS ’15), pages 1421–1430, 2015. 3, 4, 7
[DN13] Swapnil Dhamal and Y Narahari. Scalable preference aggregation in social networks.
In Proceedings of the First AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowd-
sourcing (HCOMP ’13), 2013. 4
[DN15] P. Dey and Y. Narahari. Estimating the margin of victory of an election using sam-
pling. In Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI ’15), pages 1120–1126, 2015. 4
[DTvH17] Palash Dey, Nimrod Talmon, and Otniel van Handel. Proportional representation
in vote streams. In Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017, pages 15–23, 2017. 4
[EFS09] E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, and A. Slinko. Swap bribery. In Proceedings of the 2nd
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT ’09), pages 299–310,
October 2009. 5
[FR15] Piotr Faliszewski and Jo¨rg Rothe. Control and bribery in voting. In F. Brandt,
V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia, editors, Handbook of Compu-
tational Social Choice, chapter 7. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 4
[FT17] Arnold Filtser and Nimrod Talmon. Distributed monitoring of election winners. In
Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
AAMAS 2017, pages 1160–1168, 2017. 1, 4
[HYZ12] Z. Huang, K. Yi, and Q. Zhang. Randomized algorithms for tracking distributed
count, frequencies, and ranks. In Proceedings of the 31st ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-
SIGAI symposium on Principles of Database Systems (PODS ’12), pages 295–306,
2012. 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 23, 25
[KN97] Eyal Kushilevitz and Noam Nisan. Communication complexity. Cambridge University
Press, 1997. 26, 33
[Lee15] D. T. Lee. Efficient, private, and -strategyproof elicitation of tournament voting rules.
In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI ’15), 2015. 4
[LGAL14] D. T. Lee, A. Goel, T. Aitamurto, and H. Landemore. Crowdsourcing for participatory
democracies: Efficient elicitation of social choice functions. In Proceedings of the
Second AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing (HCOMP’ 14),
2014. 4
[LRV12] Z. Liu, B. Radunovic, and M. Vojnovic. Continuous distributed counting for non-
monotonous streams. In Proceedings of the 31st ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART
Symposium on Principles of Database Systems (PODS ’12), pages 307–318, 2012. 5
31
[Raz11] Alexander A. Razborov. Communication complexity. In Dierk Schleicher and Malte
Lackmann, editors, An Invitation to Mathematics: From Competitions to Research.
2011. 26
[TW11] S. Tirthapura and D. P. Woodruff. Optimal random sampling from distributed streams
revisited. In Proceeding of the 25th international conference on Distributed computing
(DISC ’11), pages 283–297, 2011. 5
[XC10] L. Xia and V. Conitzer. Compilation complexity of common voting rules. In Pro-
ceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI ’10), pages
915–920, 2010. 4
[Xia12] L. Xia. Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules. In Proceedings of
the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’ 12), pages 982–999, 2012. 5
[YZ13] K. Yi and Q. Zhang. Optimal tracking of distributed heavy hitters and quantiles.
Algorithmica, 65(1):206–223, 2013. 9, 10, 28
A Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2. Set δ = 4 . As c is a δ-winner in E, it follows that there exist a set of voters
u1, . . . , uq′ , where q
′ ≤ δn, such that c ∈ R(E˜) for E˜ = E ∪ {u1, . . . , uq′}: that is, adding those
q′ voters to E would make c a winner. The situation is that we have an additional q voters,
vn+1, . . . , vn+q, which might have a bad impact with respect to c. Thus, our goal is to describe an
additional set of q′′ ≤ 3q voters, denoted by W = {w1, . . . , wq′′≤3q} which will nullify the (possibly)
bad impact of those q voters (which arrived after the last checkpoint) on c.
So, for each of the voting rules we consider in this paper, we will argue that c ∈ R(E˜′) where
E˜′ = E′ ∪ {w1, . . . , wq′′} ∪ {u1, . . . , uq′} = E˜ ∪ {vn+1, . . . , vn+q} ∪ {w1, . . . , wq′′}. Thus, we will
conclude that c is a 4δ = -winner with respect to E′. Below we describe the set of voters W for
each voting rule separately.
• Plurality, t-Approval, Approval: For i ∈ [q], let wi be a voter approving c, and such that
wi is not approving any candidate which was approved by vn+i (recall that in the case of
t-Approval we assume t ≤ m/2).
As c is a winner in both the elections with voters {vn+1, . . . , vn+q, w1, . . . , wq} and E˜, it holds
that c ∈ R(E˜′).
• Borda: For i ∈ [q], let wi be the “reverse” of vn+i (e.g., if vn+i : a  b  c, then wi :
c  b  a). Note that all candidates have the same Borda score with respect to the voters
{vn+1, . . . , vn+q, w1, . . . , wq}. Thus c ∈ R(E˜) implies c ∈ R(E˜′).
• Cup: Denote the set of candidates by M and consider the election E˜. In order to compute a
Cup-winner, we shall preform a series of m − 1 “head-to-head” contests. That is, there is a
set P ⊆M ×M of ordered pairs, of size m− 1, such that for every (c1, c2) ∈ P , c1 wins c2 in
an head-to-head contest. In fact, in any election Eˆ such that for every (c1, c2) ∈ P , c1 wins
c2 in an head-to-head contest with respect to Eˆ, it holds that c is a Cup-winner.
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In the beginning of the proof of Theorem 7 we argued that there is an order piP over M , such
that for every (c1, c2) ∈ P , c1 precedes c2 in piP . Next we define w1, . . . , wq. All these voters
will order the candidates with respect to piP : that is, the maximal candidate in piP will be
ranked first, the second will be ranked second, and so on. Now, for every (c1, c2) ∈ P , c1 wins
c2 in the “head-to-head” contest with respect to {vn+1, . . . , vn+q, w1, . . . , wq}, hence c1 wins
c2 in the “head-to-head” contest with respect to E˜
′. We conclude that c ∈ R(E˜′).
• Copeland and Condorcet: We prove the claim for Copeland first. For i ∈ [q], let ui be
the “reverse” of vi. For every two candidates c1, c2, a majority of the voters prefer c1 to c2
with respect to E˜ if and only if a majority of the voters prefer c1 to c2 with respect to E˜
′.
Thus, c ∈ R(E˜) implies c ∈ R(E˜′). The above proves the claim for Copeland; thus the claim
for Condorcet follows, as every Copeland winner is in particular a Condorcet winner.
• Bucklin: For i ∈ [q], let wi be a voter ranking c on top, and such that every candidate c′ 6= c,
which is ranked at position j in vn+i, will be ranked at position m− j + 1 or m− j + 2 in vj .
Note that, for every j ≤ m2 and c′ 6= c, the number of voters among vn+1, . . . , vn+q, w1, . . . wq
ranking c′ among the first j positions is at most q, while the number of voters ranking c
among the first j position is at least q.
Set n′ = n+q′+2q. Suppose that in the elections E˜, c wins at round j. Consider the election
E˜′. Then, for every candidate c′ 6= c and j′ < j, the number of voters ranking c′ among the
first j′ positions is less than n+q
′
2 + q =
n′
2 , while the number of voters ranking c among the
first j positions is at least n+q
′
2 + q =
n′
2 . We conclude that c ∈ R(E˜′).
• Run Off : Let c′ be a candidate such that c and c′ get the highest plurality score in E˜, and
such that c is winning c′ in the “head-to-head” contest with respect to E˜. Set w1, . . . , wq
to be voters ranking c′ on top, and set wq+1, . . . , w3q to be voters ranking c on top. Note
that with respect to the voters vn+1, . . . , vn+q, w1, . . . , w3q, c and c
′ have the highest plurality
score, while c is winning over c′ in the “head-to-head” contest. Thus this is also the situation
in E˜′. We conclude that c ∈ R(E˜′).
B Communication Lower Bound for No Strict Majority
A basic machinery for communication complexity lower bounds is fooling sets. Consider a function
f : {0, 1}m×k → {0, 1}. We have k players, each holding a string from {0, 1}m.
Definition 2 (Fooling set). A set A = {(x11, . . . , x1k), . . . , (xs1, . . . , xsk)} ⊆ {0, 1}m×k is called a
fooling set for the function f : {0, 1}m×k → {0, 1}, if there are some bit b ∈ {0, 1} such that:
1. For every i, f(xi1, . . . , x
i
k) = b.
2. For every i 6= j, there is (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ {xi1, xj1} × · · · × {xik, xjk} such that f(y1, . . . , yk) 6= b.
A fooling set is called a 1-fooling set if the bit b above is 1 (similarly, a 0-fooling set). The proof
of the following fact can be found in the textbook by Kushilevitz and Nisan [KN97].
Fact 1. Let f : {0, 1}n×k → {0, 1} be some function with fooling set A. Then, D(f) ≥ log |A|.
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We denote by f l =
∧l
i=1 f : {0, 1}n×k×l → {0, 1} a function that gets as input l inputs for f and
returns 1 if and only if the output of all the l instance is 1. Formally, f l
(
(x11, . . . , x
1
k), . . . , (x
l
1, . . . , x
l
k)
)
=
f(x11, . . . , x
1
k) ∧ f(x21, . . . , x2k) ∧ · · · ∧ f(xl1, . . . , xlk). The proof of the following lemma is straightfor-
ward, albeit we attach the proof for completeness.
Lemma 7. Suppose f has a 1-fooling set of size s. Then f l has a 1-fooling set of size sl.
Proof. Let A = {y1 = (x11, . . . , x1k), . . . , ys = (xs1, . . . , xsk)} ⊆ {0, 1}n×k be a 1-fooling set for f . We
argue that Al (l-wise Cartesian product of A with itself) is a 1-fooling set for
∧
f l.
Indeed, for every
(
yi1 , . . . , yil
) ∈ Al, it holds that
f l
(
yi1 , . . . , yil
)
=
l∧
j=1
f(yij ) =
l∧
j=1
1 = 1 .
Moreover, take two different points (yi1 , . . . , yil) and (yj1 , . . . , yjl) in Al. There is some index r ∈ [l]
such that yir 6= yjr . Set yir = (z1, . . . , zk) and yjr = (w1, . . . , wk). As yir , yjr ∈ A, there is
x ∈ {z1, w1} × · · · × {zk, wk} such that f(x) = 0. In particular
f l
(
yi1 , . . . , yir−1 , x, yir+1 , . . . , yil
)
=
∧
j∈[l]\{r}
f(yij ) ∧ f(x) =
∧
[l]\{r}
1 ∧ 0 = 0,
as required.
Now, we are ready to prove Lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 6. Using Lemma 7 and Fact 1, it will be enough to show that NSM2k,m, 1
4
has a
1-fooling set of size Ω(mk).
We start by defining n metrics over {0, 1}m×2k:
di ((A1, . . . , A2k) , (B1, . . . , B2k)) = |{j | i ∈ Aj 4Bj}|
Here, Aj 4Bj = (Aj \Bj) ∪ (Bj \Aj) is the symmetric difference.8
d ((A1, . . . , A2k) , (B1, . . . , B2k)) = max
i
di ((A1, . . . , A2k) , (B1, . . . , B2k)) .
It is straightforward to verify that d is indeed a metric.
Let S = {(A1, . . . , A2k) ∈ {0, 1}m×2k | ∀i ∈ [m], |{j | i ∈ Aj}| = k} be all the points such that
every index i ∈ [m] appears in exactly k sets. Note that |S| = (2kk )m, and that ∀x ∈ S,
NSM2k,m, 1
4
(x) = 1. We will construct a subset S ′ ⊆ S in a greedy manner. In each phase we
will choose an arbitrary x ∈ S, which was not deleted yet, add it to S ′ and delete all of B(x, k/2),
i.e., all the points in S which are at distance at most k/2 from x (with respect to the metric d).
It holds that
|B(x, k/2) ∩ S| =
 k/4∑
i=0
(
k
i
)2m ≤ (2 · ( k
k/4
)2)m
.
8In fact di is just the Hamming distance after we project the strings to the i’s coordinate.
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To see the equality, denote x = (A1, . . . , A2k). For each index i ∈ [m], there are k sets containing
i. We should choose j ≤ k/4 sets to remove i from, and j new sets to insert i into. All this is
taken in power of m as we have m different indices. To see the inequity, note that for i ≤ k/4,(
k
i
)
/
(
k
i−1
)
= k−i+1i > 2. Hence
∑ k
4
−1
i=0
(
k
i
)2
<
(
k
k/4
)2
.
By the end of the process (when all the points in S were deleted), we have a set S ′ of size at least(
(2kk )
2·( kk/4)
2
)m
such that for every x, y ∈ M ′, d(x, y) ≥ k/2. We argue that S ′ is a 1-fooling set. As
S ′ ⊆ S, it holds that ∀x ∈ S ′, NSM2k,m, 1
4
(x) = 1. Consider x 6= y ∈ S ′, where x = (A1, . . . , A2k) and
y = (B1, . . . , B2k). There is an index i such that di(x, y) ≥ k/2. Therefore, |{j | i ∈ Ai ∪Bi}| ≥ 54k.
In particular, there is z ∈ {A1, B1} × · · · × {A2k, B2k} with at least 54 sets containing i, implying
NSM2k,m, 1
4
(z) = 0.
Finally, we lower bound |S ′|. Recalling Stirling’s formula, which says that n! ≈ √2pin (ne )n, and
the identity
(
2k
k
)
=
∑k
i=0
(
k
i
)2
, we have that:
(
2k
k
)
2
(
k
k/4
)2 ≥
(
k
k/2
)2(
k
k/4
)2 =
(
k
4 !
)2 (3k
4 !
)2(
k
2 !
)4 = Ω(1) ·
(
k
4
) 1
2
k (3k
4
) 3
2
k(
k
2
)2k = Ω(1) ·
(
3
3
2
4
)k
.
We conclude that
D
(
NSM2k,m, 1
4
)
≥ log (∣∣S ′∣∣) ≥ log
Ω(1) ·(3 32
4
)km = Ω(mk) .
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